Duquesne Law Review
Volume 10

Number 1

Article 15

1971

Malpractice - Vicarious Liability of an Operating Surgeon
Lawrence S. Pope

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lawrence S. Pope, Malpractice - Vicarious Liability of an Operating Surgeon, 10 Duq. L. Rev. 117 (1971).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol10/iss1/15

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Recent Decisions
unequivocal legislative determination of public policy; 2 therefore,
any attempt to waive local health or housing code violations should
be declared void.
This concept of prohibiting waiver of local housing regulations as
applied to rent withholding laws has already been recognized by the
California courts.33 Indeed, Common Pleas Courts in Pennsylvania
have extended Boyd 3 4 to nullify clauses in leases which have violated
local safety ordinances. 35
The courts, having already prohibited the waiver of public policy
as declared by the legislature in the form of health and safety laws,
should have little difficulty in prohibiting the waiver of local health
and housing ordinances which are utilized to effect the legislative purpose behind the Rent Withholding Act.
It should be noted that the court, in holding the Act constitutional
and interpreting it to the tenant's advantage, has indicated that it recogriizes the importance of the rent withholding concept. This legislative and judicial mandate can be frustrated if landlords are permitted
to devise leases which will cause tenants to waive the benefits the Rent
Withholding Act was designed to afford them.
Mark Louis Glosser

MALPRACTICE-VIARIOus LIABILITY OF

AN OPERATING

SURGEON--The

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a trial judge may not
direct a jury verdict on the issue of the vicarious liability of an operating surgeon for the negligence of his assistants.
Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118, 275 A.2d 23 (1971).
Plaintiff underwent surgery for a ruptured disc. After Dr. Hutchinson
successfully removed the disc he left the operating room, leaving the
closing of the incision to three orthopedic residents. These residents,
employees of the hospital, had been selected to assist in this operation
by the operating room supervisor, also an employee of the hospital.
32. Bell v. McAnulty, 349 Pa. 384, 386, 37 A.2d 543, 544 (1941).
33. Buchner v. Azuali, 251 Cal. App. Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 920 (1969).
34. 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
35. Maglin v. Weinberg, 21 D. & C.2d 630 (1959) defective fire escape; Fegley v. Pinsker,
104 P.L.J. 73 (1955) defective furnace; Harris v. Greenberg, 17 D. & C.2d 1966 (1968) defective stairs and poor lighting; cf. Bowman v. McGillick, 104 P.L.J. 484 (1956).
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In closing the incision, these residents failed to remove a surgical
sponge from the wound. This failure was stipulated at trial to be
negligent.
The trial court directed the verdict for the plaintiff on the only
remaining issue, whether Dr. Hutchinson was vicariously liable for
the negligence of these residents. The court acted on the basis of
Dr. Hutchinson's pretrial deposition; he having died before the trial
began. In this deposition he stated that the residents were his "assistants" and that he was "directing" the operation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial
court was not justified in directing the issue of liability for the plaintiff. The court refused to construe the defendant's deposition statements as admissions of agency. In addition, the court decided that
binding instructions for the plaintiff were not justified on any theory
of vicarious liability.
In McConnell v. Williams,' the first Pennsylvania case to deal in
this area, the court removed a non-suit in favor of a privately hired
obstetrician holding that he could be vicariously liable for the negligence of a hospital intern who was assisting him. In that case the court
stated:
[I]n the course of an operation in the operating room of the hospital, and until the surgeon leaves the room at the conclusion of
the operation ... he is in the same complete charge of those who
are present
and assisting him as is the captain of the ship over all
2
on board.
From this quotation arose the "captain of the ship" doctrine which
was to govern the vicarious liability of operating surgeons in the future.
This doctrine was next employed to remove a non-suit in favor of
a privately hired surgeon whose nurse negligently burned the patient
during the preoperative procedure under the surgeon's supervision. 3
In -these two cases the court applied established principles of the
"borrowed servant" concept to the operating room. Under the "borrowed servant" concept the test of whether the borrowing party was
liable for the negligence of the "borrowed servant" was whether the
borrowed employee was subject to the direction and control of the
1. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
2. Id. at 362, 65 A.2d at 246.
3. Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 547, 122 A.2d 209 (1956).
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borrowing employer. 4 The "captain of the ship" doctrine was just a
recognition of the high degree of control that an operating surgeon
must have over the operating room.
In later cases 5 the court broadened this doctrine and deviated significantly from the "borrowed servant" concept as it had evolved with
its emphasis on the benefit to the master. 6 In Rockwell v. Stone 7 the
court held an anesthesiologist vicariously liable for the negligence of
his subordinate. The defendant was, at the time, acting as a salaried
supervisory employee of the hospital. Although he had control of his
alleged servant, he received no personal benefit from this subordinate's
performance. In Rockwell v. Kaplan," a case arising from the same
facts, the court held the operating surgeon vicariously liable although
he was not present and although it was not established that he had
any authority over the induction of anesthesia. In other words, the
operating surgeon had no control over the quality of the anesthesiologist's performance; the surgeon could only order him to either begin
administering or stop administering the anesthetic. Thus the "captain
of the ship" doctrine was used to extend vicarious liability to cover
persons, who in other areas of agency law, were considered independent contractors. 9 In fact the court had so extended the doctrine that
vicarious liability could attach even though the alleged servant was
not acting for his master's private benefit and even though it was not
clear that the alleged master had the right to control the quality of
performance.
The court in Collins v. Hand10 began to backstep from this extreme
position. In holding that the right to order the beginning and end of
performance was insufficient to make one a master it implicitly overruled Rockwell v. Kaplan." It noted that such rights did not constitute the right of control in the manner of performance, especially
when the actors were more expert in the procedure than the alleged
4. Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 414, 45 A.2d 59, 61
(1945). In this case the hospital was the general employer, the obstetrician and the
surgeon were borrowing employers, and the intern and the nurse were the borrowed
servants.
5. Yerston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959); Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 561,
173 A.2d 48 (1961); Rockwell v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
6. Commonwealth to the use of Orris v. Roberts, 392 Pa. 572, 584-85, 141 A.2d 393, 399
(1957).
7. 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961).
8. 404 Pa. 575, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
9. See Mature v. Angele, 373 Pa. 593, 600-601, 97 A.2d 59, 62 (1953).
10. 431 Pa. 378, 246 A.2d 398 (1968).
11. 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1964).
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master. Thus the court brought the right of control aspect of the
"captain of the ship" doctrine back into line with general agency law. 2
This doctrine was finally limited to the confines of the "borrowed
servant" concept by the noted case. The court itself stated that the
"captain of the ship" doctrine was "but the adaptation of the 'borrowed servant' concept in the law of agency to the operating room
of a hospital."'3 There was no question the defendant surgeon had
the right of control over the resident. Indeed, he admitted he was
"directing" the operation and that the residents were his "assistants."
The only issue left for the jury on retrial was whether the residents
were acting for the defendant's private business benefit. Thus the court
brought the tests of a master-servant relationship from general agency
law 14 back into the "captain of the ship" doctrine.
In so limiting this doctrine the court was acting to correct an aberration introduced into the law by the tort immunity of public hospitals. in previous cases' 5 the court had said or cited with approval that:
If operating surgeons were not to be held liable for the negligent
performances of those who were working under them, the law
would in large measure fail to afford a measure of redress for
preventable injuries sustained during the course of such operations.16

In view of the demise of this immunity17 the court found this rationale
was no longer applicable. It concluded that liability should not be
extended to the operating surgeon merely to financially restore the
patient.
The court, however, in correcting this aberration in the agency law
of medical malpractice, introduced a new aberration. It left to the jury
the establishment of a standard against which the vicarious liability
of the operating surgeon was to be measured. This was contra to the
Pennsylvania law of general agency wherein it was stated that "where
the facts are not in dispute and the evidence presents no sufficient
grounds for inconsistent inferences therefrom, the question as to who
12. 373 Pa. at 600-601, 97 A.2d at 62.
13. Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118, 125, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (1971).
14. 392 Pa. at 584-85, 141 A.2d at 399.
15. McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949); Benedict v. Bondi, 384
Pa. 547, 122 A.2d 209 (1956); Yerston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959); Rockwell
v. Stone, 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961); Rockwell v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54
(1961).
16. 361 Pa. at 364, 65 A.2d at 247.
17. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965), overturning
the tort immunity of public non-profit hospitals.
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is the servant's employer is a matter for the determination of the
court."' 8 In such cases, 19 the determination of whether there was a
master-servant relationship was treated as a matter of law. The function of the jury, in such a situation, was to act merely as a fact finder.
The function of the jury in finding a master-servant relationship
must be distinguished from its function in determining primary negligence. In the former situation the jury should measure the facts
against the standard given it by the court,20 whereas in the latter case
the jury should formulate its own standard of what a "reasonable
21
man" would have done.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to make this distinction
and therefore erroneously reversed the trial court's determination in
the instant case. There were no conflicting facts in this case. It was
clearly established at trial by the defendant's own statements that the
residents were subject to his control. Since the defendant surgeon
was acting to further his private practice there was no question that
the negligent residents were furthering his personal business. Yet the
court left the determination of the operating surgeon's vicarious liability to the jury on retrial.
It may be that the Supreme Court was using this case as a vehicle
to correct the anomaly introduced into the law by the tort immunity
of public hospitals. However, it is submitted that it should have done
so without leaving the area of medical malpractice outside of general
agency law. The court should have given the jury a standard with
which to measure the vicarious liability of the defendant surgeon.
A standard suitable for this problem was developed in the New
York case of Santise v. Martins Inc. 22 In that case the court borrowed
18. 373 Pa. at 598, 97 A.2d at 60.
19. McGrath v. E.G. Budd Mfg. Co., 348 Pa. 619, 36 A.2d 303 (1944), wherein the court
reversed a jury finding of a master-servant relationship declaring that the relationship
did not exist as a matter of law, and Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403, 101 A.2d 304
(1926), wherein the court sustained a non-suit based on a trial court's determination
that the plaintiff was the defendant's servant and therefore was precluded from suing
by the Worker's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 22 (1966).
20. 373 Pa. at 598, 97 A.2d at 60.
21. Kramer v. Standard Steel Car Co., 281 Pa. 348, 351, 126 A. 800, 801 (1924); Blasi
v. Bonnert, 186 Pa. Super. 179, 142 A.2d 752 (1958); see also 27 P.L.E. Negligence § 196
(1960).
22. 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1940). In this case the plaintiff went into the
basement of the defendant's department store and tried on a pair of shoes in the shoe
department. One of the shoes had a nail protruding from the inner sole which injured
the plaintiff. The shoe department was, in fact, run by an independent contractor who
leased space from the defendant's department store. The New York court held that the
department store could be vicariously liable for the plaintiff's injury since it was indeed
the "ostensible owner" of the shoe department.
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the concept of "ostensible owner" from the principal-agent law and
applied it to master-servant law. The court held that if one allowed
himself to appear to be the master of an alleged servant he would
be vicariously liable for that apparent servant's negligence.
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had adopted this concept it
would have been a significant improvement in the law. It would
have allowed the various medical specialists to delimit their respective areas of expertise to the patients and thereby correspondingly
limit their legal responsibility. 23 However, if these medical practitioners left the patient in the dark as to the complexity of modern
day surgical procedure the patient could look to those he depended
on for legal responsibility. For instance, if a patient were made aware
that the anesthesiologist had sole control over the administration of
anesthesia and that such procedures were outside the expertise of
the surgeon, then the surgeon would not be legally responsible for
any negligence of the anesthesiologist.
Under such a scheme it is difficult to foresee how the hospital
could ever escape liability. If the negligent actor were not an actual servant of the hospital, e.g. a resident, he would probably be an apparent servant. For example, any private doctor whom the hospital
allowed to operate at their facilities would appear to be their servant. In most cases he would be all but their actual servant. He
would be acting for the hospital's business benefit since it would
receive fees for the use of the operating room which it could only
receive if surgeons operated there. In addition, he would be subject
to the hospital's rules regarding procedures, and in most cases he
would be obliged to utilize the hospital staff to assist. If special circumstances did arise in which the hospital's right of control were
more limited it could reveal this to the patient and escape liability.
Lawrence S. Pope
23. As is pointed out in Mahoney, Pennsylvania's Captain of the Ship Doctrine: A
Mid-Twentieth Century Anachronism, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 432 (1967), one of this state's failings in the law of vicarious liability for medical malpractice has been an inability to
recognize the complete and differing expertise of different actors in the operating room
of a modern hospital.
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